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Since gaining independence, sub-Saharan Africa has experienced periods of internal 
conflict at higher rates than other regions.  The region has also experienced protracted 
economic problems.  Many African countries have implemented International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) programs designed to improve a state’s long-term economic viability. IMF 
conditionality, however, has led to a host of problems in sub-Saharan Africa that 
potentially increase the risk of experiencing internal conflict.  The results of this research 
demonstrate that the implementation of the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility 
significantly increases a country’s risk of experiencing armed civil conflict.  Neither the 
Structural Adjustment Facility nor the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility have the 
same affect, though prior conflict, higher GDPs, negative GDP growth, moderate levels 
of social fractionalization, transitional regimes and the presence of enclave economies do 
increase conflict risk.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Does International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditionality lead to an increased risk 
of violent civil conflict in sub-Saharan African states?  Since gaining independence, 
many sub-Saharan African countries have experienced periods of internal conflict and 
civil war at a higher rate than other regions.  In fact, the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute stated in its 1999 Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmaments 
that “Africa is the most conflict ridden region of the world and the only region in which 
the number of armed conflicts is on the increase” (SIPRI 1999). The disastrous effects of 
these wars include economic stagnation, political instability and humanitarian crises—all 
of which worsen the longer a conflict lasts.  These consequences have been well 
documented, yet the international community still faces numerous challenges with regard 
to resolving and preventing such conflict.  This inadequacy is due in part to an 
incomplete understanding of the underlying conditions that facilitate insurgency efforts.  
Thus it is necessary to examine more closely the possible roots of such conditions. 
The factors contributing to civil war are complex and involve numerous variables.  
Some of the more recognized factors include economic grievances, lootable resources, 
regime type, social fractionalization, population pressure, geography and prior history of 
conflict.  The economic woes of poorer countries contribute to the onset of conflict, 
largely because the foregone income of would-be insurgents is very low.  Recruitment 
and retention of fighters is thus much easier to maintain. The presence of an easily 
exploited resource base may also be problematic if conflict participants are profiting from 
these resources.  The type of regime a country has is also important, as many scholars 
have linked transitional governments to higher rates of internal strife.  Another factor that 
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has received substantial attention is population pressure.  Many argue that when more 
people are competing for increasingly scarce resources, civil violence is more likely to 
erupt.  Difficult geography, such as mountainous regions or dense forest cover, may also 
facilitate insurgent efforts because they are better able to organize without detection.  
Finally, a country with a prior history of internal conflict could be more likely to 
experience conflict in the future, though this effect fades with time. 
The role of International Financial Institutions (IFIs) in causing civil conflict has 
received much less attention.  In particular, International Monetary Fund programs such 
as the Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF), the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility 
(ESAF) and the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) include conditions that 
are designed to improve a state’s long-term economic viability.  These programs have 
received substantial criticism, mainly due to the short-term shocks resulting from 
requirements such as decreased social spending and currency devaluation.  Few have 
explored how these conditions may actually increase a country’s risk of experiencing 
civil conflict. IMF conditionality may create circumstances ripe for conflict in three 
ways.  First, decreased social spending in sectors such as health care and education may 
lead to increased grievances and more willing insurgents.  In addition, IMF conditions 
place severe restrictions on patronage systems, which may decrease African states’ 
capacity to prevent rebellion. Finally, because of reductions in military expenditures, 
armed forces may not be as able to suppress internal violence when it does arise.   
The goal of this project was to test the hypothesis that the implementation of the 
IMF’s Structural Adjustment Facility, Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility or 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility increases the risk of sub-Saharan African 
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countries experiencing violent civil conflict.  Violent civil conflict is defined by the 
Uppsala Armed Conflicts Dataset as conflict incurring more than 25 battle deaths per 
year. The hypothesis was tested using the Cox variant of a discrete time, repeated events 
duration model.  Because internal conflict is not solely attributable to a single variable, 
the model included measures of the following control variables: economic grievances, a 
lootable resource base, regime type, social fractionalization, population pressure, 
geography, prior conflict history and implementation of other forms of conditionality.   
This paper begins with a review of the theoretical underpinnings of the causes of 
civil conflict, including the control variables of economic grievances, exploitable 
resources, regime type, social fractionalization, population pressure, geography and prior 
conflict history.  Following will be a discussion of how the primary independent variable, 
IMF program implementation, may increase grievances and limit a state’s capacity to 
prevent and manage armed conflict.  A description of the research design follows, 
including an explanation of the methods of operationalizing the key variables and a 
description of the duration model.  The analysis concludes with the results and 
implications for future analysis. 
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REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
 Violent civil conflicts have many consequences, all of which become 
progressively worse as duration increases.  In the sub-Saharan African context, this is 
particularly problematic because civil wars in Africa typically last longer than those in 
other regions (DeRouen and Sobek 2004).  As such, the factors contributing to internal 
conflict have received much international attention.  Some of the most prominent 
variables include economic grievances, exploitable resources, regime type, social 
fractionalization, population pressure, and prior civil conflicts.  Cuts in public spending, 
declining state capacity, and reduced military capability are additional important factors, 
which I will link to the implementation of IMF programs.  The following review 
highlights the theoretical bases of each. 
  
Economic Grievances 
 Economic deprivation is a strong indicator of the onset of violent internal conflict.  
Africa is characterized by exceptionally poor economic conditions, and it has also been 
the region with the highest rates of internal conflict in recent history (Collier and Hoeffler 
2002).  What might the reasons be for this correlation?  A number of dynamics contribute 
to increased incidence and length of armed intrastate conflicts in poor countries.  First, in 
states with stronger economies the costs of war are higher, thus making prolonged 
conflict unattractive. In poorly performing economies, however, mobilization of potential 
insurgents is not as difficult.  Mobilization is enabled when economic grievances are 
high: potential rebels may have extremely limited economic opportunities, thus their 
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forgone income is very low (Collier and Hoeffler 2004).  This dynamic is essential to the 
sustenance of an insurgency—if a rebellion is unable to recruit and retain enough fighters 
it will not be able to pose a significant threat to state forces.  Empirical evidence supports 
this hypothesis:  Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbum (2004) find that overall poverty, as 
measured by per capita income, is a reasonably significant indicator for the onset of civil 
war. 
 Despite these findings, the theoretical support for economic grievance factors of 
the onset of civil conflict is perhaps stronger than the actual empirical data.  Studies have 
demonstrated covariation among the variables, but poor economic performance is also 
characteristic of many sub-Saharan African states that have not experienced violent civil 
conflict.  Another possible explanation of why some countries are vulnerable to civil 
conflict is the availability of a lootable resource base. 
 
Lootable Resources 
Berdal and Malone (2000) write extensively on the topic of economic agendas 
and civil war.  They point out that war may not be simply a means to an end, as is often 
thought, but it may be an end in and of itself.  In states where poverty is rampant, war 
may provide the opportunity for some groups to take advantage of resources to which 
they may not have previously had access.  The presence of lootable resources thus 
becomes another major factor in the onset of civil war, as it may be more profitable to 
some groups than peace. 
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) also point out that profitable opportunities play a 
major role in internal conflict.  This opportunity is often marked by the existence of an 
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exploitable natural resource.  Murshed (2002) agrees with this analysis.  He cites the 
tendency for mineral-rich states such as Angola and Sierra Leone to be more vulnerable 
to conflict because of the availability of capturable rents from these resources.   
Leonard and Strauss (2003) refine this argument, stating that the mere existence 
of exploitable natural resources is not a sufficient explanation.  The authors develop the 
concept of the enclave economy, in which production is geographically concentrated.  
This relative isolation makes resources more lootable, thus increasing their attractiveness 
to insurgents and state forces alike. 
 While many resource-rich African countries have seen high rates of violent 
internal conflict, other resource-poor countries have also experienced civil war.  One 
might then conclude that other factors are at work. 
 
Regime Type 
 An additional factor in predicting civil war is that of regime type.  For example, 
Kadera et al. (2003) model the linkages between states’ domestic political system and 
conflict.  Their findings suggest that initial increases in the strength of democracy are 
associated with higher instances of conflict.  However, as democratic systems strengthen 
beyond a certain threshold the likelihood of experiencing conflict goes down.  Ultimately 
their findings suggest that the traditional view of democracies being more immune to 
conflict only holds when the democracy is well-established and possesses a certain 
amount of strength. 
 Hegre et al. (2001) extend this thesis and posit that civil wars are more likely in 
transitional regimes.  Thus, not only are established democracies more likely to avoid 
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internal conflict, so are extremely repressive authoritarian states.  The authors use a 
multivariate analysis to demonstrate the relationship between democracy and domestic 
strife.  In essence they rely on the notion that intermediate regimes are partially open, but 
still possess repressive characteristics.  The repression leads to grievances, which then 
incite groups to organize and engage in anti-government activities, which is possible 
because of a certain level of openness. 
 These findings suggest that certain political systems may be more vulnerable to 
the onset of civil violence.  However, there are still many other recognized causes of civil 
war.  The following section will provide a brief overview of fractionalization, another of 
these factors. 
 
Social Fractionalization 
 The impact of ethnic divisions on civil conflict, whether based on language, 
religion or other characteristics, has perhaps received the most attention from the 
international community.  This attention is not surprising given the atrocities associated 
with ethnic conflicts in countries such as Rwanda and Burundi.  The origin of such 
intractable divides is often attributed to the practices of colonial powers, who often 
favored certain ethnic or religious groups over others (Chazan et al 1999, Murshed 2002).   
The consequences of such practices resulted in more rigid social identities than had 
existed prior to colonization.  Furthermore, by encouraging these identities colonial 
powers did little to foster a sense of territorial nationalism (Welsh 1996).  Despite this 
trend, violent ethnic and/or religious conflict is actually a rare occurrence (Brubaker and 
Laitin 1998).  Social identity, however, provides a rallying point—one that may assist a 
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rebel movement in overcoming collective action problems (Murshed 2002). 
 Many scholars have noted that moderate levels of ethnic and religious 
fractionalization contribute to the onset of violent civil conflict (Elbadawi and Sambanis 
2000; Murshed 2002; Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbum 2004; Fearon 2004).  One would 
not expect to observe high rates of conflict where fractionalization is very low or very 
high for similar reasons.  In especially homogenous societies, social minorities are so 
small that even if identity-based grievances exist, the minorities are unlikely to possess 
enough power relative to the majority in order to mount an insurgency.  Likewise, in 
highly diverse societies groups will face more challenges either in organizing against one 
another or in uniting against a common enemy (Buhaug and Gates 2002, Murshed 2002, 
Collier and Hoeffler 2004, Hegre 2004).   
 However, when a small number of ethnic or religious groups exist in a state, they 
are more likely to be polarized against one another (Buhaug and Gates 2002, Murshed 
2002).  If this lower level of diversity is accompanied by noticeable inequalities between 
the groups, rebel groups are able to mobilize potential fighters by exploiting such 
divisions.     
 Despite the preceding evidence, ethnic fractionalization alone cannot explain the 
onset of violent civil conflict.  Many states are characterized by ethnic divisions, but 
these divisions frequently do not lead to armed conflict.  Grievances are often based on 
scarce resources, which the following section will address. 
 
Resource Scarcity and Population Pressures 
 Another prominent theory of conflict involves the conflict over scarce resources.  
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Many scholars, including Fearon and Laitin (2003), argue that this conflict is driven by 
large populations and is a major causal factor of civil war.   
 Homer-Dixon cites vast populations in developing lands as being one of the major 
causes of conflict (1994).  Resource depletion, land scarcity and unequal distribution are 
all sources of violence.  Maxwell and Reuveny (2000) elaborate on this theory, citing that 
if conflict results in resource destruction, then the political system may be further 
destabilized, resulting in veritable collapse. 
 These viewpoints may reflect a popular sentiment in the international community, 
but they are not supported by the evidence.  Tir & Diehl (1998) find only a modest 
relationship between population growth pressures and violent conflict in general.  
Furthermore, they were unable to link population growth to conflict at the nation-state 
level.  Hauge and Ellingsen (1998) also find only modest linkages between population 
and conflict, and go on to suggest that political and economic factors may be more 
important.  Ridgeway and Jacques (2002) are more mistrusting of the population-conflict 
link, citing that such a limited focus disguises inherent problems with unequal 
distribution patterns.   
 
Difficult Geography 
 The role of physical geography in conflict has received increasing attention.  
Rough terrain may contribute to increased risk for civil conflict because rebels are better 
able to hide their activity from government forces.  Buhaug and Gates, however, find no 
empirical evidence that either forest cover or mountainous regions affect the scope of 
conflict, but they do not test for the possibility that these factors affect the onset of 
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conflict (2002).  In contrast, Fearon and Laitin find evidence that geography may have a 
significant impact on facilitating insurgency (2003).  However, their analysis is self-
admittedly limited.  In defining difficult geography, the authors simply coded the variable 
according to the existence of mountainous regions in a state.  They did not account for 
other impenetrable areas such as dense forest cover.  DeRouen and Sobek (2004) also 
examine the effects of physical geography on insurgency efforts.  They find that states 
with mountainous regions, but not those with dense forest cover, facilitate rebel 
movements.   
 
Prior History of Civil Conflict 
 Numerous scholars recognize that countries with a history of civil conflict are 
more likely to experience civil conflict in the future.  In 1973, Hibbs found that internal 
war was significantly more likely if a country had experienced civil war in the past.  
Hegre et al. advanced this argument by demonstrating that “time heals all wounds,” and 
the effect of past conflicts fades as the years pass (2001, 37).  Collier and Hoeffler find 
repeated support for this assertion, further refining it by demonstrating that countries are 
most at risk of a renewal of violence in the first five years after the previous conflict has 
ended (2002, 2004).  After this initial period, the risk gradually fades.  
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IMF CONDITIONALITY AND ARMED CIVIL CONFLICT
 The level of state capacity is very important to the prevention and management of 
armed conflicts.  As Fearon and Laitin (2003, 75-76) point out, “financially, 
organizationally, and politically weak central governments render insurgency more 
feasible and attractive.”  Other scholars support this claim, citing that weak domestic 
institutional structures and state incapacity can lead to increased opportunities for 
insurgents (Reynal-Querol 2002).  Few have examined how IMF conditionality may 
actually decrease state capacity, thus increasing a country’s risk of experiencing civil 
conflict.  Conditions placed on IMF loans may increase this risk through three avenues.  
First, cuts in social spending and public goods may increase grievances among the 
population.  Second, conditions often limit the availability of patronage resources that 
would otherwise appease potential insurgents.  Finally, restrictions on military spending 
may decrease a state’s ability to quash rebellions when they do occur.  This section will 
begin with a historical overview of IMF programs in sub-Saharan Africa. Following will 
be a discussion of the three processes through which IMF conditionality may increase the 
risk of violent civil conflict.  
 African leaders have historically dealt with problems of weak state capacity by 
relying on patronage networks designed to appease certain segments of the population 
(Herbst 1990, Riddell 1992).  Patronage systems allow governments to provide a variety 
of resources such as jobs, favorable import quotas and access to government contracts to 
their preferred clients and supporters.  This kind of state intervention led to a host of 
economic problems such as currency overvaluation and distorted prices (Fearon 1988, 
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Herbst 1990, Collier and Gunning 1999).  The patron-client system, however, served 
important functions by appeasing potentially restive populations, thereby reducing threats 
to political stability (Herbst 1990).  In addition, patronage systems often provided 
increased funding for the military and police (Riddell 1992).  Therefore, if violence did 
erupt, the military would arguably be more capable of suppressing such displays.  
Nevertheless, economic problems trumped other concerns, particularly when African 
countries began to face overwhelming financial crises in the early 1980s. 
Africa’s economic troubles during this time can be traced to both internal and 
external forces.  Exogenous shocks such as the collapse of primary commodity markets 
and a rise in fuel prices were intensified by domestic policies that resulted in large budget 
and trade deficits (Fearon 1988, Riddell 1992).  As a result of these problems, African 
countries increasingly turned to IFIs such as the International Monetary Fund for 
assistance.  The IFIs responded with the development of structural adjustment programs.  
The IMF first launched the Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) in 1986.  Under this 
facility, low-income countries were able to borrow up to 63.5 % of their IMF quota over 
three years, to be disbursed in annual installments.  In exchange, these countries were 
expected to develop a medium-term policy framework for overcoming balance of 
payments problems (Boughton 2001).  The SAF focused primarily on implementing 
monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policies such as deficit reduction, cuts in public 
spending and currency devaluation.  Fiscal adjustments led to an increased focus on 
unproductive spending in general, including excessive military spending (Davoodi et al 
2001).   
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Performance under the SAF, however, was somewhat disappointing.  Many 
argued that the resources available to countries under the SAF were too small to have 
much of an effect.  The IMF encouraged additional bilateral assistance to supplement 
SAF loans, with little success.  Furthermore, IMF staff and management believed that 
conditions attached to SAF programs were not strong enough to ensure that program 
objectives would be achieved (Boughton 2001).  As a result, the IMF reviewed the SAF 
and proposed several changes. 
In 1987 the IMF established the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF), 
a concessional lending instrument that would be available to poor countries in addition to 
the original SAF (IEO 2005).1  The ESAF greatly expanded the amount of financing 
available to low-income borrowers: countries were now allowed to draw up to 250% of 
their IMF quota over three years, or even up to 350% in exceptional circumstances 
(Boughton 2001).  The ESAF relied more heavily on structural conditions “intended to 
complement and buttress macroeconomic policies, raising the likelihood that program 
objectives will be attained” (Ghosh et al. 2005, 143).  Structural measures included 
improving the tax structure, strengthening public expenditure management, privatizing 
state-owned enterprises, liberalizing trade and removing subsidies (Fearon 1988, Riddell 
1990, IMF 1997, Ghosh et al. 2005).  The intended effect was to instill sound 
macroeconomic policies that would both overcome immediate financial difficulties and 
also ensure long-term economic sustainability (IMF 1997, Paris 2004).  The expansion of 
conditionality associated with the ESAF demonstrates an important characteristic of IMF 
programs: they tend to impose more severe conditions as the level of assistance increases 
                                                 
1 SAF programs were gradually phased out after the introduction of the ESAF.  All structural adjustment 
financing fell under the ESAF after 1995. 
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(Fearon 1988).  This is most likely because states in need of more extensive financial 
assistance are more readily persuaded to accept these severe conditions. 
After implementation, structural adjustment programs received much criticism 
because these narrowly focused and inflexible IMF policies tend to ignore the short-term 
consequences of rapid liberalization (Collier and Gunning 1999).  This oversight was 
especially significant in relation to currency devaluation and limits on public spending.  
The primary objection was that adjustment policies overlooked distributional effects and 
thus widened economic inequality.  Overnight increases in unemployment and sudden 
price increases had particularly adverse effects on poorer segments of the population.  
Furthermore, limits on public spending often resulted in decreased funding for health and 
education, which dealt another blow to disadvantaged sectors of society (Fearon 1988, 
Riddell 1992, Collier and Gunning 1999).  It is thus not surprising that structural 
adjustment became the target of substantial criticism. 
Presumably in response to growing disapproval, the IMF replaced the ESAF with 
the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) in 1999 (IMF 2005).  The PRGF 
represented the IMF’s effort to broaden its focus from macroeconomic stabilization to 
include growth and poverty reduction. Whereas poverty reduction had only received 
fleeting attention in previous structural adjustment documents, the new PRGF-supported 
programs were underscored by comprehensive country-owned poverty reduction 
strategies and an emphasis on pro-poor spending.  In addition, the PRGF aimed to 
streamline conditionality by establishing guidelines focusing on parsimony and criticality 
of conditions.  Internal assessments have shown that, under the PRGF, conditionality is 
used less frequently and is more focused on macroeconomic policy than on structural 
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measures (IEO 2005).  IMF critics nonetheless persist, citing that the new poverty 
programs are little more than a new label.  The policies are still very narrowly focused, 
inflexible, and have done little to actually reduce poverty (Bird 2004, Gomez and Lawson 
2005, Gottschalk 2005). 
In addition, IMF conditionality may increase a country’s risk of civil conflict in 
several ways.  First, cuts in social spending and public goods may increase grievances in 
the population, therefore making insurgency more attractive.  In its 2003 Economic 
Report on Africa, the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) stressed that a 
macroeconomic program not addressing issues of social and political grievances could be 
very dangerous, even in countries not affected by civil conflict.  The provision of public 
goods is an essential government function, and restricting this function with spending 
cuts may contribute to higher levels of social unrest.  For example, in 1990 the Rwandan 
government devoted 5.4% of its revenue to social spending.  By 1992, one year after 
Rwanda implemented an IMF-led structural adjustment program, that amount had fallen 
to 1.7% (WDI 2007).  The root causes of the ensuing conflict and genocide in Rwanda 
clearly run much deeper than decreases in social spending.  It is possible, however, that 
cuts in public goods helped exacerbate an already-tense situation. 
 Another way that IMF programs may increase the risk of conflict is by limiting 
patronage resources. IMF conditionalities resulted in serious strain for patron-client 
systems, which was one main goal of the policies.  According to Stedman, “economic 
conditionality cut at the heart of the patrimonial state” (1996, 243).  Austerity measures 
severely restricted state spending, which led to a marked decrease in the state’s ability to 
provide side payments or other concessions to their clients.  Many states were required to 
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cap domestic credit expansion, limiting the flow of patronage to government officials 
(Fearon 1988).  Furthermore, cuts in bureaucratic jobs and a greater role for the private 
sector decreased support for the political elite (Howe 2001).  These reductions in 
patronage resources make the state more vulnerable to political crisis, in part because it is 
much less flexible in managing grievances (Herbst 1990).  Empirical evidence seems to 
support this claim: Lindenberg and Devarajan (1993) found that merely participating in a 
structural adjustment program increases the likelihood of regime collapse: 27% of 
regimes that undertook structural adjustment collapsed during its implementation, 
compared with a 9% rate of collapse among regimes that had not participated in such 
programs.  This seems to suggest that the resulting cuts in patronage resources may lead 
to increased risk of rebellion. 
Finally, reductions in military spending may decrease a state’s ability to suppress 
armed uprisings when they do occur.  IMF-supported programs have accounted for an 
11% decrease in military spending since the end of the Cold War (Davoodi et al. 2001).   
Such decreases are desirable in cases where military spending is excessive and where 
regime accountability is historically low, as is the case with many African countries.  In 
instances such as these, increased military spending may actually lead to more violence, 
particularly if government forces are the aggressors in a conflict. But if a state is 
confronting a legitimate security threat, this emphasis on military cuts seems illogical.   
 For example, in 1987 the IMF implemented an adjustment program in Uganda.  
At the time, the country had been involved in an armed civil conflict since 1981.  Despite 
this fact, IMF programs encouraged and succeeded in implementing cuts in military 
spending: between 1989 and 1992, military spending fell from 2.6 percent to 1.6 percent 
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of the gross domestic product (GDP) (SIPRI 2007).  Perhaps as a result of these cuts, the 
Ugandan army was not able to suppress the insurgency, and the conflict continued.  
Chappell’s 1998 film “Our Friends at the Bank” documents negotiations between 
Museveni and his ministers and officials representing the World Bank and IMF.  One of 
the most contentious points in the discussions was the inability of the government to 
provide sufficient financial support for its military in order to quash the long-running 
rebellion.  So far their success in quashing the rebellion has been limited: the uprising 
continued through 2004, and although 2005 saw few battle-related deaths, the peace 
process has stumbled on several occasions (Uppsala 2006, BBC 2007).  Had the Ugandan 
government been allowed more funding for its military, it is possible that the conflict 
would have escalated.  It is also possible, however, that government forces would have 
been better equipped to suppress the conflict for good.  
Thus it seems that the imposition of IMF conditionalities may have consequences 
beyond those popularly cited in the literature.  Adjustment programs have long been 
criticized for their social consequences, but their role in causing armed conflict has 
received less direct attention.  However, the IMF is not the only institution that imposes 
conditions on lending—its sister organization, the World Bank, also uses conditionality.  
Traditionally, the IMF has relied more heavily on policy reforms as a condition for 
financial support.  In contrast, the World Bank has focused mainly on lending for specific 
projects, such as infrastructure or agricultural development (Fearon 1988).  The Bank 
shifted this emphasis in the early 1980s with the introduction of its own structural 
adjustment programs.  It began to provide balance of payments financing conditional on 
policy changes and administrative reform (Fearon 1988).  Despite the increasing overlap 
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of Bank and IMF programs in areas such as tax policy and public administration, the two 
organizations still maintained distinct areas of expertise (World Bank 2001).  Under 
adjustment programs, IMF conditionality largely remained focused on macroeconomic 
and structural policies, while the Bank’s conditions addressed structural policies (those 
that are not directly related to macroeconomic policy), social policy and institutional 
reform (World Bank 2001).   
Critics often maintain that IMF conditionality is more severe than that of the 
World Bank.  Fearon states that “[t]he IMF stabilization programmes usually compromise 
the most economically essential and politically difficult reforms – devaluation, limits on 
the expansion of government spending and domestic credit, subsidy removals, and 
liberalized foreign-exchange allocation procedures” (1988, 125).  Furthermore, a suitable 
macroeconomic framework—as determined by the IMF—is often a prerequisite for 
disbursement of World Bank loans (Fearon 1988, World Bank 2001).  IMF conditionality 
is generally seen to result in more severe political consequences, but because the World 
Bank plays a significant role in areas such as bureaucratic reform and privatization—both 
examples where patronage resources are traditionally available—any analysis should 
control for the presence of World Bank loans.  The Bank utilizes two lending 
instruments: “development policy lending” and “investment” lending.  The “investment” 
category includes loans for specific projects such as technical assistance or investment in 
a certain sector.  “Development policy lending” includes structural adjustment and 
poverty reduction support credits; these loans are generally tied to conditions related to 
structural, financial sector, and social policy reform, in addition to improving public 
sector resource management (World Bank 2007a).  Loans focusing on development 
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policy are more relevant to this analysis since resulting policy changes would affect 
larger segments of the population. 
Another form of conditionality falls under the Heavily Indebted Poor Country 
(HIPC) Initiative, a program launched by the IMF and World Bank in 1996 that aims to 
ensure that no country is overloaded with a debt burden it cannot manage (IMF 2007a).  
In order to qualify for debt relief under the HIPC Initiative, a country must demonstrate 
good performance under IMF- and World Bank-led programs, in addition to 
implementing further reforms such as increased social spending.  Because debt relief 
would ease financial obligations of governments and allow them to devote more 
resources to public goods, the implementation of a HIPC program may offset some of the 
negative consequences of previous adjustment policies. 
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METHODS
 This analysis will use the Cox variant of a discrete time repeated events duration 
model, a form of event history analysis.  This model examines the duration of peace, or 
length of time before a country experiences conflict.  It will test the hypothesis that the 
implementation of an IMF program increases a country’s risk of experiencing violent 
civil conflict.  The model uses event history data; the country year is the unit of analysis.    
 
Event History Analysis 
 Event history analysis examines the duration and timing of events. Because 
timing plays a major role in political events such as civil conflict, this type of analysis is 
especially desirable for political science research.  However, despite the increasing focus 
on processes of change in political science, empirical research still often focuses on fixed 
relationships occurring at a single point in time.   Many scholars avoid this shortfall by 
using time-series or panel data, but even in these cases the temporal structure of the data 
is often ignored (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997).   
Political scientists are often “interested in knowing how the duration spent in one 
social state affects the probability some entity will make a transition to another social 
state” (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997, 1414).   Some examples include the amount of 
time a state takes to adopt a certain policy or, more relevant to this analysis, the length of 
time before a country experiences military conflict.  In analyses such as these the timing 
of events is critical to understanding outcomes.  Event history data, structured as a 
longitudinal record of when certain events happen to a sample of entities, examines the 
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effects of timing on outcomes (Allison 1984).   
Traditional regression-based models, however, are not suitable for analyzing 
event history data.  Event histories generally have two features that cause significant 
problems for traditional statistical models such as multivariate regression: time-varying 
covariates and censoring (Allison 1984).   This analysis incorporates several control 
variables that fluctuate over time, such as GDP growth and regime type.  A regression 
model, however, must treat all covariates as fixed.  It cannot account for variation over 
time in the control variables, and therefore is unable to account adequately for the effects 
of timing on outcomes (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997).  
Another limitation of regression models is their inability to address problems of 
censored cases.  If this analysis were to use a standard regression to measure the amount 
of time it takes a country to experience conflict (or the duration of peace), the dependent 
variable might be expressed in the number of years before a country experiences armed 
internal conflict.  Those countries that do not experience conflict, however, present an 
analytical problem.  It is impossible to assign a value to these countries because it is not 
known when, if ever, they will experience conflict.  An alternative would be to assign the 
maximum value to the dependent variable—in this case 26 years, the number covered in 
the dataset. However, if these cases are included they are implicitly treated as having 
experienced conflict, when in fact they have not.  If they are left out of the dataset 
altogether, the sample is biased because only countries prone to experiencing conflict 
would be represented (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997).  A possible solution may be 
to express the dependent variable as a dummy indicator.  This method is also 
problematic, because a dummy variable would not capture the variation in time before a 
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state experiences conflict (Allison 1984, Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997).  Event 
history models can avoid both of these problems.   
Two of the key concepts in event history or duration models are the risk set and 
the hazard function.  The risk set is the sample of cases that are at risk of experiencing an 
event.  The hazard function represents the rate at which a duration ends in a given 
interval, assuming that it has not already ended prior to the start of the interval.  It is 
interpreted as the risk of an event occurring, providing that it has not already occurred 
(Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997).  In this analysis, the risk set is the sample of 
countries included in the analysis, and the hazard function represents the risk that each 
country has of experiencing conflict at any given time.  
The data for this model are structured for a discrete-time repeated events analysis.  
Discrete time data are gathered at specific intervals, in this case once a year, even though 
changes may occur at any time.  Because a country may experience multiple conflicts, it 
is appropriate to use a repeated events model.  This allows for the estimation of the 
duration of peace preceding each instance of conflict, not just the first conflict episode.  
 
Data 
The forty-eight countries of sub-Saharan Africa represent the population of 
possible cases.  Four countries had to be excluded from the analysis due to missing data: 
no data is available for Somalia’s GDP, and Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, and Sao Tomé 
and Principe are all missing measures of fractionalization.  Once these exclusions are 
taken into account, the total number of cases becomes forty-four.  Table 1 lists the 
countries in the dataset, the dates of any conflict occurring in the country, IMF programs 
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Table 1. Conflict and IMF Assistance by Country 
Country Conflict Dates IMF Programs Total IMF Assistance 
(million SDRs)* 
Angola 1980 – 2002** 
2004 
None 0 
Benin None SAF 1989 – 1992 
ESAF 1993 – 1999 
PRGF 2000 – 2005 
111.73 
Botswana None None 0 
Burkina Faso 1987 SAF 1991 – 1994 
ESAF 1993 – 1999 
PRGF 2000 – 2005 
146.62 
Burundi 1991 – 2005 SAF 1986 – 1989 
ESAF 1991 – 1994 
PRGF 2004 – 2005 
87.80 
Cameroon 1984 ESAF 1997 – 1999 
PRGF 2000 – 2005 
244.36 
Cape Verde None PRGF 2002 – 2005 8.64 
Central African Republic 2001 – 2002 SAF 1987 – 1990 
ESAF 1998 – 1999 
PRGF 2000 – 2002 
45.76 
Chad 1980 – 1994** 
1997 – 2002 
2005 
SAF 1987 – 1990 
ESAF 1995 – 1999 
PRGF 2000 – 2005 
117.58 
Comoros 1989 
1997 
SAF 1991 – 1994 2.25 
Congo, Republic of 1993 – 1994 
1997 – 1999 
2002 
ESAF 1996 – 1999 
PRGF 2004 – 2005 
29.62 
Congo, Democratic Republic 
of 
1996 – 2001 SAF 1987 – 1990 
PRGF 2002 – 2005 
698.97 
Côte d’Ivoire 2002 – 2004 ESAF 1994 – 2001 
PRGF 2002 – 2005 
515.88 
Djibouti 1991 – 1994 
1999 
ESAF 1999 – 2000 
PRGF 2001 – 2003 
13.63 
Ethiopia 1980 – 1991** 
1996 – 2005 
SAF 1992 – 1995 
ESAF 1996 – 1999 
PRGF 2001 – 2005 
179.19 
Gabon None None 0 
The Gambia 1981 SAF 1986 – 1988 
ESAF 1988 – 1991, 1998 – 1999 
PRGF 2000 – 2005 
50.07 
Ghana 1981 
1983 
SAF 1987 – 1988 
ESAF 1988 – 1992, 1995 – 1999 
PRGF 2000 – 2005 
848.07 
Guinea 2000 – 2001 SAF 1987 – 1990 
ESAF 1991 – 1999 
PRGF 2000 – 2005 
163.91 
Guinea-Bissau 1998 – 1999 SAF 1987 – 1990 
ESAF 1995 – 1998 
PRGF 2000 – 2003 
19.33 
Kenya 1982 SAF 1988 – 1989 
ESAF 1989 – 1994, 1996 – 1999 
PRGF 2000 – 2005 
423.32 
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Lesotho 1998 SAF 1988 – 1991 
ESAF 1991 – 1994 
PRGF 2001 – 2004 
53.19 
Liberia 1980 
1989 – 1995 
2000 – 2005 
None 0 
Madagascar None SAF 1988 – 1989 
ESAF 1989 – 1992, 1996 - 1999 
PRGF 2000 – 2005 
234.88 
Malawi None ESAF 1995 – 1999 
PRGF 2000 – 2005 
136.22 
Mali 1990 
1994 
SAF 1988 – 1990 
ESAF 1992 – 1999 
PRGF 2000 – 2005 
220.62 
Mauritania None SAF 1986 – 1989 
ESAF 1989 – 1999 
PRGF 2000 – 2004 
153.96 
Mauritius None None 0 
Mozambique 1980 – 1992** SAF 1987 – 1990 
ESAF 1990 – 1999 
PRGF 2000 – 2005 
317.31 
Namibia None None 0 
Niger 1992 
1994 
1996 – 1997 
SAF 1986 – 1988 
ESAF 1988 – 1991, 1996 – 1999 
PRGF 2000 – 2005 
159.69 
Nigeria 2004 None 0 
Rwanda 1991 – 1994 
1997 – 2002 
SAF 1991 – 1994 
ESAF 1998 – 1999 
PRGF 2000 – 2005 
74.07 
Senegal 1990 
1992 – 1993 
1997 – 2001 
SAF 1986 – 1988 
ESAF 1988 – 1992, 1994 – 1999 
PRGF 2000 – 2005 
424.89 
Seychelles None None 0 
Sierra Leone 1991 – 2000 SAF 1986 – 1989, 1994 – 1995 
ESAF 1994 – 1998 
PRGF 2001 – 2005 
266.29 
South Africa 1980 – 1988** None 0 
Sudan 1983 – 2005 None 0 
Swaziland None None 0 
Tanzania None SAF 1987 – 1990 
ESAF 1991 – 1994, 1996 – 1999 
PRGF 2000 – 2005 
491.09 
Togo 1986 
1991 
SAF 1988 – 1989 
ESAF 1989 – 1998 
100.38 
Uganda 1981 – 1991 
1994 – 2005 
SAF 1987 – 1989 
ESAF – 1989 – 1999 
PRGF 2000 – 2005 
501.36 
Zambia None ESAF 1995 – 1999 
PRGF 2000 – 2005 
1257.03 
Zimbabwe None ESAF 1992 – 1995 151.90 
*Total IMF assistance under the SAF, ESAF and PRGF from 1980 – 2005; 1 SDR = 1.53 USD 
**Start date of conflict precedes 1980 
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and total IMF assistance from 1980 – 2005.  Out of these cases, nineteen countries 
experienced conflict after implementing an IMF-led structural adjustment or PRGF 
program.  In addition, seven countries did not implement IMF programs and experienced 
no conflict. The remaining eighteen countries represent cases where either conflict 
occurred without any IMF programs being in place or conflict preceded the 
implementation of an IMF-led program. 
Measurement for all variables will begin in 1980, the earliest year data are 
available in the IMF’s World Economic Outlook Database, and continues until 2005, the 
most recent year all data are available.2  Once a country experiences conflict it is dropped 
from the dataset.  It reenters the year peace is reestablished. Though 1980 is a limitation 
imposed by availability of data, it is an acceptable start date since the height of the debt 
crisis had yet to hit and it is several years prior to the implementation of the first 
Structural Adjustment Facility in 1986. The model incorporates measurements on the 
control variables of economic grievances, exploitable resources, regime type, social 
fractionalization, population pressure, difficult geography, prior civil conflict and other 
forms of conditionality.  Table 2 presents summary statistics of the variables. 
 
Armed Civil Conflict 
 In this analysis, the dependent variable of armed civil conflict is defined as a 
country having a minimum of 25 battle-related deaths a year, as defined in the Uppsala 
Conflict Data Program (UCDP)/Oslo International Peace Research Institute (PRIO) 
Armed Conflict Dataset.  A dummy variable represents whether a country experienced 
                                                 
2 Djibouti and Namibia are two exceptions—GDP data is not available for Djibouti prior to 1987, and 
Namibia did not win its independence from South Africa until 1990. 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
conflict in a given year: a measure of 1 indicates there was conflict; 0 represents the 
absence of conflict.  Because it is reasonable to expect that a country with a history of 
conflict is more likely to experience internal violence, an additional independent control 
variable will reflect whether the country experienced conflict prior to 1980. 
 
IMF Programs 
 Countries often enter into standby arrangements prior to their accession to the 
Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF), the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility 
Variable          Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Conflict 939 0.543 0.227         0 1 
IMF SAF 939 0.081 0.273         0 1 
IMF ESAF 939 0.171 0.377 0 1 
IMF PRGF 939 0.140 0.347 0 1 
World Bank 939 0.347 0.476         0 1 
HIPC 939 0.094 0.292         0 1 
GDP 939 7.283 20.669       0.105 239.42 
Per Capita GDP 939 960.533 1384.997       59.5 8853.7 
GDP Growth 939 3.387 6.315       -27.2 106.3 
Fractionalization 939 0.611 0.197        0.03 0.85 
Fractionalization2 939 0.411 0.201 0.001 0.718 
Enclave 939 0.215 0.411         0 1 
Regime 939 4.697 1.531         1 7 
Regime2 939 24.417 13.125 1 49 
Population Density 939 67.179 98.988       1.57 614.78 
Forest Cover 939 30.932 23.393        0.22 86.96 
Topography 939 1.038 0.076       0.709 1.454 
Prior Conflict  
(Absorbing State) 
939 0.475 0.500        0 1 
Prior Conflict  
(Proximity Log) 
939 0.981 1.235         0 3.714 
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(ESAF) or the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF).  These standby 
arrangements are accompanied with very low levels of conditionality; therefore they are 
not included in this analysis.  Because of the higher levels of conditionality associated 
with the SAF, ESAF and PRGF, only these three programs will be included in this model.  
In the literature, scholars do not often differentiate between the SAF and ESAF.  Because 
these two programs differ in the level of financing and scope of conditionality, they will 
be tested as two separate dummy variables.  In addition, critics argue that PRGF 
programs are essentially the same as structural adjustment, despite the PRGF’s increased 
focus on poverty reduction.  In order to ascertain whether these criticisms hold merit, 
PRGFs will also be tested separately. Therefore three dummy variables will indicate 
whether each country was taking part in an IMF-led SAF, ESAF or PRGF in a given 
year.  An additional variable will represent the total amount in SDRs of IMF 
disbursements each year under the SAF, ESAF and PRGF. 
 The International Monetary Fund publishes a history of each member country’s 
lending arrangements.  Unfortunately, information contained on each country page is not 
accurate.  Concessional lending arrangements in sub-Saharan African countries are 
classified as falling under either the SAF or PRGF.  None of the countries is shown to 
have undergone an ESAF program, which is incorrect.  Because the SAF was officially 
laid to rest in 1995, and the PRGF was not created until 1999, any program falling within 
this period appears to be misclassified.  Several additional sources were required in order 
to properly classify each country’s lending arrangements, including country documents 
available on the IMF website and Boughton’s in-depth historical overview of the IMF’s 
operations between 1979 and 1989 (2001). 
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 Because IMF programs may contribute to an increased risk for civil conflict in 
many ways, an ideal analysis would include measures of the different mechanisms that 
may affect conflict.  Proxies would include figures for social spending, military 
expenditures, overall budget cuts, privatizations and reductions in public jobs.  
Unfortunately, data for these indicators are rarely available before the early 1990s.  
Because the IMF introduced structural adjustment programs in 1986, the initial effects of 
these programs are not represented in the data.  Due to this limitation, it is extremely 
difficult to parse out the main explanatory variable into the different causal pathways.   
 
Other Forms of Conditionality 
 Dummy variables represent whether a country is also participating in a program 
involving other forms of conditionality.  The World Bank projects database classifies 
each lending project into one of two categories: “development policy lending” and 
“investment” (World Bank 2007b).  A country is coded as “1” if it is participating in 
development policy lending in a given year, and “0” if it is not.  HIPC countries are 
coded in the same fashion; the data is taken from the IMF’s database of HIPC country 
documents (IMF 2007b). 
 
Economic Grievances 
 In this analysis I use three proxies for economic grievances.  Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) indicates the overall economic condition of the country.  A lagged GDP 
variable is included as well to control for autocorrelation.  Per capita GDP represents 
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economic conditions at the individual level.3  In addition, annual percent change in GDP 
reflects whether changing economic conditions impact conflict.  Measurement is taken 
each year, and reflects current prices of the US dollar.  The source of data is the 
September 2006 World Economic Outlook Database, published by the IMF.  The Gini 
coefficient, which measures income inequality, would be a useful additional proxy for 
economic grievance.  Unfortunately, consistent measures of the Gini coefficient are 
missing for a majority of the countries in the dataset, so this variable is not included in 
the model.  This exclusion may be justified in that most countries in sub-Saharan Africa 
arguably have high levels of income inequality. 
 
Lootable Resources 
 Leonard and Strauss (2003) provide the proxy measurement for lootable 
resources: enclave economies.  They base their classification on the value of exports from 
minerals, timber and estate agriculture as a percentage of exports.  A value of at least 
75% classifies the country as having an enclave economy.  The authors do not provide 
data for all countries, so information from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators (WDI) database and the CIA World Factbook provide the data necessary to 
classify the countries excluded from their analysis.    
 
Regime Type 
 Freedom House’s Freedom in the World Country Rankings is used to code for 
regime type (2007).  This framework assigns values to states, rating them on a scale of 1 
                                                 
3 Measures of Gross National Income may be a more suitable proxy to demonstrate foregone income 
opportunities, but data were not available for many countries.  Thus, GDP data will serve as an appropriate 
substitute. 
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to 7 for the level of political rights and civil liberties. Countries with average scores of 
1.0 to 2.5 are considered Free, those with scores of 3.0 to 5.0 are considered Partly Free, 
and those with scores of 5.5 to 7.0 are considered Not Free.  Because the predicted 
relationship is curvilinear, a squared fractionalization term is included in the model. 
 
Social Fractionalization 
 Annett (2001) developed an index for the measurement of ethnolinguistic and 
religious fractionalization for the IMF.  The author calculates fractionalization using data 
from the World Christian Encyclopedia.  He produces measurements for 150 countries—
a marked increase over previous indices such as the 1960 Soviet-produced index of 
ethnic fractionalization, which included only 119 countries and did not account for 
religious divides (Anett 2001).  The fractionalization index measures the probability that 
two randomly selected individuals will belong to different ethnolinguistic and religious 
groups.  Thus, a low score of 0 would represent an entirely homogeneous society, while a 
high score of 100 indicates complete heterogeneity.  Theory suggests that countries with 
moderate scores would be more likely to experience protracted civil conflict.  A squared 
term is included to allow for the possibility of a nonlinear relationship. 
 
Resource Scarcity and Population Pressures 
 Competition for resources is measured in terms of population density.  The higher 
the density, the more likely people are to compete over resources in a given state. The 
World Development Indicators provide measurements on this variable. 
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Difficult Geography 
 Difficult geography is represented by two variables.  The first is forest cover, 
expressed as a percentage of total land area covered by forest.  The second is a proxy for 
topography, and is calculated as a ratio of a country’s surface area to total land area.  
Higher ratios represent greater changes in elevation, which provides an estimation of 
mountainous regions in a country.  All of these measurements come from the World 
Development Indicators. 
 
Prior History of Civil Conflict 
 Two variables account for a country’s past history of civil conflict.  The first, an 
absorbing state dummy, reflect whether a country has experienced any violent civil 
conflict post-independence.  A value of “1” reflects that the country saw at least 25 
battle-related deaths in at least one year since gaining independence.  The second variable 
estimates the fading impact of past conflicts on a country’s likelihood of experiencing 
renewed violence.  It is expressed as the natural log of the number of years since the 
previous conflict ended. 
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RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
 Table 3 reports the results of the model.  Model fit is good: chi2 is 112535, which 
far surpasses the critical value of 45.315 required to be significant at the p < .001 level 
with twenty degrees of freedom.  The coefficients for IMF-led structural adjustment and 
PRGF programs are actually negative, the opposite of the expected direction, but neither 
variable is statistically significant.  However, the coefficient for the Enhanced Structural 
Adjustment Facility is 0.707, in the expected direction, and is significant.  This indicates 
that ESAF programs increase a country’s risk of experiencing civil conflict by 102.8%. 
Total IMF assistance is not significant, nor are controls for other forms of conditionality 
(World Bank and HIPC programs).  
 Both measures of the impact of prior conflict are significant in the expected 
directions.  The absorbing state prior conflict dummy has a coefficient of 0.738, meaning 
that any post-independence conflict, regardless of when it occurred, increases the hazard 
of experiencing civil conflict by 109.2%.  The coefficient of the proximity of prior 
conflict indicates that every one unit increase in the log of years since the prior conflict 
ended results in a 25.5% decrease in the hazard rate.  When the effects of these two 
variables are calculated together, a country will no longer be at increased risk of renewed 
violence after about thirteen years.  The coefficients for overall GDP and and the lagged 
GDP variable are both significant. Interestingly enough, the GDP variable indicates that 
wealthier countries actually have a slightly higher risk of experiencing conflict.  GDP 
growth is also significant, showing that for every one percent increase in GDP growth, 
the hazard rate decreases by about 7%.  Both fractionalization variables are significant, 
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Table 3. Predicting the Risk of Civil Conflict 
Note: Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the following levels: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
 
Variable Coefficients 
(Standard Error) 
P Percent Change in the 
Hazard Rate 
Constant -10.141*** 
(3.110) 
0.001 -100.0% 
SAF -0.762 
(0.699) 
0.275 -53.4% 
ESAF 0.707* 
(0.418) 
0.091 102.8% 
PRGF -0.304 
(0.849) 
0.720 -26.2% 
Total IMF Assistance -0.001 
(0.002) 
0.617 -0.1 
World Bank Program -0.045 
(0.392) 
0.909 -4.4% 
HIPC Country 0.050 
(0.690) 
0.942 5.1% 
GDP 0.099 
(0.035) 
0.005 10.1% 
Lagged GDP -0.105 
(0.046) 
0.024 -10.0 
Per Capita GDP -0.0004 
(0.0003) 
0.162 0.0% 
GDP Growth -0.070*** 
(0.026) 
0.008 -6.8% 
Fractionalization 5.090** 
(2.487) 
0.041 16,139.0% 
Fractionalization2 -6.188** 
(2.659) 
0.020 -99.8% 
Enclave  0.801** 
(0.415) 
0.053 122.8% 
Regime 2.232*** 
(0.803) 
0.007 831.8% 
Regime2 -0.239*** 
(0.086) 
0.006 -21.3% 
Population Density 0.001 
(0.001) 
0.352 0.1% 
Forest Cover -0.007 
(0.011) 
0.511 -0.7% 
Topography 1.904 
(2.023) 
0.346 571.3% 
Prior Conflict (Absorbing State) 0.738** 
(0.377) 
0.050 109.2% 
Prior Conflict (Proximity Log) -0.295** 
(0.126) 
0.019 -25.5% 
Chi2 112.53*** 0.000  
Log Pseudolikelihood -159.00976               
n 44   
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indicating that the expected parabolic relationship is confirmed.  Initial increases in the 
fractionalization measure lead to heightened risk of civil conflict, but once the 
fractionalization level reaches .41, that risk begins to decrease.  Both regime variables are 
also significant, indicating a similar parabolic relationship.  Once calculated, the 
inflection point is 4.67, indicating that the risk begins to decrease once the Freedom 
House score moves from 4.5 to 5.0.  The presence of an enclave economy is also 
significant, increasing the hazard rate by 118%.  None of the other control variables 
representing per capita GDP, population density, forest cover or topography are 
significant. 
 These results are quite interesting because critics of IMF conditionality tend to 
paint the different programs with one wide brush.  Those who do acknowledge 
differences generally separate PRGF programs from structural adjustment, stating that the 
former does constitute a qualitative improvement over the latter.  Critics who discuss 
structural adjustment programs, however, do not often differentiate between the original 
Structural Adjustment Facility and the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility.  The 
findings, however, suggest that conditionality associated with the original SAF does not 
lead to increased instability, while conditions attached to the ESAF do place countries at 
a higher risk of civil conflict.  It is thus important to revisit the differences between the 
two programs in order to determine what aspects of these programs account for these 
differing impacts. 
 As previously mentioned, the original SAF programs focused almost entirely on 
macroeconomic reform of fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policy.  These conditions 
required decreased public spending and currency devaluations that disproportionately 
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affected poorer segments of the population.  Heightened grievances resulting from these 
initial shocks would presumably lead to increased attractiveness for insurgency.  It 
appears, however, that this was not the case.  The SAF variable was not significant, and 
even if it had been it would indicate that the SAF is actually associated with a decreased 
risk of experiencing civil conflict.  It may be possible that governments had some success 
in convincing their constituents that the difficult short-term consequences of adjustment 
were necessary to ensure long-term economic sustainability and prosperity. 
 The transition to the ESAF represented a broadening in the scope of IMF 
conditionality.  ESAF programs relied on structural measures such as improving the tax 
structure (widening the tax base), strengthening public expenditure management, 
removing subsidies and privatizing state-own enterprises.  By definition, these reforms 
were more intrusive and were designed to hold governments more accountable for their 
performance under the ESAF.  It is a reasonable assertion that the conditions attached to 
ESAF programs therefore dealt a major blow to patronage networks—an intended effect 
of IMF conditionality.  SAF programs did require overall budget cuts that undoubtedly 
limited the financial resources available to patronage-based governments.  These systems, 
however, traditionally relied on a wide variety of patronage resources extending beyond 
monetary payments.  Governments could provide jobs, favorable import quotas, tax 
breaks and other concessions to their preferred clients.  The implementation of SAF 
programs therefore only restricted one of the major patronage resources: money.  Non-
monetary patronage resources were still largely intact. 
Structural conditionality associated with the ESAF, however, cut much deeper 
into patronage networks.  Widening the tax base meant that it would be more difficult for 
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governments to give tax breaks to preferred clients.  Increased focus on privatizing state-
owned enterprises and streamlining the bureaucracy decreased the number of public jobs 
available.  Trade liberalization limited governments’ ability to reward their supporters 
with concessions such as favorable import quotas.  ESAF programs thus severely 
restricted patron-client systems, an intended effect of conditionality, but they also had 
unintended consequences in that they apparently led to an increased risk of violent civil 
conflict.   
This risk decreases with the introduction of PRGF programs, perhaps because the 
IMF issued new guidelines on conditionality at this time. Internal assessments have found 
that under the PRGF conditionality is being used more sparingly and is more focused on 
the IMF’s core area of responsibility, macroeconomic policy, rather than on structural 
reforms (IEO 2005).   
In order to better understand which structural reforms have the most impact on civil 
conflict, an ideal analysis would incorporate measures of these conditions: privatizations, 
reductions on public jobs, changes to the tax structure and other proxies.  Unfortunately 
these data are not available for much of the time period examined in this analysis.  
Therefore it is not possible to dissect ESAF programs into the different causal pathways 
in a quantitative analysis such as this.  Future research in this area would benefit from in-
depth case studies of the impacts of structural conditionality on patronage networks. 
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CONCLUSION
 In sum, IMF conditionality has led to a host of problems in sub-Saharan African 
countries.  Conditionality programs required policies that had particularly negative 
consequences for the poor, such as currency devaluation and social spending cuts.  
Decreased patronage resources limited governments’ ability to provide concessions or 
side-payments to potentially restive populations.  Finally, cuts in military spending may 
have made states unable to quash rebellion when it did occur.  All of these problems 
potentially increase a country’s risk of experiencing internal conflict.   
The results of this analysis support the hypothesis that IMF conditionality increases the 
risk of conflict.  Structural conditions attached to the ESAF may have limited the 
availability of patronage resources to such an extent that governments were no longer 
able to maintain the stability of patron-client systems.  Grievances increased, political 
support eroded, and in many cases civil conflict ensued.  SAF and PRGF programs are 
not associated with the high level of invasive structural conditions found in ESAF 
programs, and neither of these variables was significant.  Prior conflict, negative GDP 
growth, moderate levels of social fractionalization, transitional regimes and the presence 
of enclave economies all significantly increase conflict risk.  Due to the lack of 
quantitative data on many of the structural conditions associated with IMF programs, 
future research utilizing in-depth case studies would provide a more complete 
understanding of the linkages between IMF conditionality and armed civil conflict. 
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